There is an objective world, that is "really" out there; however, we--as experiencing subjects--must bracket, limit, and define that objective world.

The phenomena is not the actual object, it is the impression of the object which passes through the mind. Phenomenology is therefore the study of those phenomena which pass through the mind.        

The world is always constituted by a collective, subjective genesis.

Husserl distinguishes between the noetic--that which experiences, the experiencing--and the noematic--that which is experienced, being experienced.
The noetic is real and fundamental, while the noematic is dependent and, strictly speaking, unreal--that which is perceived is constituted, insofar as it is perceived, by the perceiving subject.

"We that are, indeed, men, spiritual and bodily, existing in the world, are, therefore, 'appearances' unto ourselves, parcel of what 'we' have constituted, pieces of the significance 'we' have made. The 'I' and 'we', which we apprehend, presuppose a hidden 'I' and 'we' to whom they are 'present'." This second "I" is the transcendental "I," the transcendental perceiving subject which actually constitues the daily "subject" or ego.

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        Husserl insists on an "objective" reality. There is an objective world, that is "really" out there; however, we--as experiencing subjects--must bracket, limit, and define that objective world. We receive, or perceive, sensuous information; however, what we deal with is always a reduction, a simplification, a narrowing of that infinite source of information that is the objective world. "Our comprehensive epoch [epoche, a check or suspension of judgement] puts, as we say, the world between brackets, excludes the world . . . from the subject's field, presenting in its stead the so-and-so-experienced-perceived-remembered-judged-thought-valued-etc., world, as such, the "bracketed" world."
        The phenomena is not the actual object, it is the impression of the object which passes through the mind. Phenomenology is therefore the study of those phenomena which pass through the mind.
        Husserl asks how we can agree on what a particular object is. He appeals to a collective sense or category--in a kind of Platonic move--which he calls the transcendent, the realm of "essence" or eidoV. "Any closed field may be considered as regards its 'essence,' its eidoV, and we may disregard the factual side of our phenomena, and use them as 'examples' merely." This realm of essence, however, is created by us collectively; when he says that "all consciousness is 'intentional', he gives the ground for this collective creation of "essence." It is a collective "intending," a collective and agreed-upon abstracting from the objective world. The world is always constituted by a collective, subjective genesis. "All objective existence is essentially 'relative', and owes its nature to a unity of intention, which being established according to transcendental laws, produces consciousness with its habit of belief and its conviction."
        Husserl distinguishes between the noetic--that which experiences, the experiencing--and the noematic--that which is experienced, being experienced. An important part of the analysis of consciousness consists in tracing the relation between these (Peirces Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness are analogous--the noematic, that which is experienced, corresponds to Firstness, while the noetic, that which experiences corresponds to the awareness of Firstness which is Secondness, and the analysis, or the tracing of the realtion between the noematic and the noetic, corresponds to Thirdness). The noetic is real and fundamental, while the noematic is dependent and, strictly speaking, unreal--that which is perceived is constituted, insofar as it is perceived, by the perceiving subject.
        This distinction between that which perceives and that which is perceived carries over into our own sense of our "selves." "We that are, indeed, men, spiritual and bodily, existing in the world, are, therefore, 'appearances' unto ourselves, parcel of what 'we' have constituted, pieces of the significance 'we' have made. The 'I' and 'we', which we apprehend, presuppose a hidden 'I' and 'we' to whom they are 'present'." This second "I" is the transcendental "I," the transcendental perceiving subject which actually constitues the daily "subject" or ego. The Jungian parallel to this is expressed in what he calls the "transcendent function," a union of conscious and unconscious contents in which the narrow ego, in a process of "individuation" becomes more and more united with those psychic contents not contained in the ego until a new Self emerges. What Husserl appears to be doing is taking the cogito of Descartes and universalizing it as a transcendent cogito, a consciousness that constitutes the entire universe through its perception--a Vishnu, whose dream is the universe, sleeping on his cosmic lotus. His are--assuming I am not mangling them beyond recognition--precisely the sort of ideas guaranteed to raise the Gallic ire of postmodernism.